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I. INTRODUCTION.
From the beginning of scientific assessment of climate change in the late 1970’s
to the most recent conference of the parties (COP) to the Kyoto Protocol in Doha in
2012, the international community has been attempting to establish a workable legal
regime to deal with climate change. The purpose of this article is to explore some of
the legal effects this emerging international climate change regime may have on
energy prices in the foreseeable future.
Specifically, this article in section II article accepts certain predicates relating to
climate change and energy prices. In section III, it lays out briefly the thirty year,
largely unsuccessful, history of the attempts to establish an international legal regime
to deal with climate change. Section IV argues that despite the lack of success in
1
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establishing an international legal regime, certain legal principles have been
established that will affect energy prices in the foreseeable future. Section V
concludes that those legal principles should be taken into account by states,
legislators, policy makers, energy companies, advocates, consumers and investors in
making energy pricing decisions and energy pricing predictions in the coming
decades.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY PRICING PREDICATES.
For purposes of this article, certain fundamental assumptions are accepted. First,
climate change is occurring by the accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the
atmosphere. Second, since the industrial revolution the activities of human beings in
the use of energy resources to do work are a major contributor to greenhouse gases.
Third, the production and use of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) are the
primary source of mankind’s GHG released into the atmosphere. Fourth, climate
change produces and potentially will produce serious and potentially harmful
adverse effects on global and local societies, including warming of the planet, sea
level rise, changes in ocean temperatures, melting of the polar ice caps and mountain
snow packs, melting of permafrost, weird weather events, increase in insects, loss of
coastal habitats, changes in agricultural lands and the like. Fifth, for the most part,
the costs of climate change occasioned by mankind’s production and use of fossil
fuel energy resources is not accurately reflected in wholesale or retail energy prices
and remain largely external to energy purchasing decisions. Sixth energy and gross
domestic product (GDP) are closely linked. For developing countries to develop
economically, they must have affordable and reliable sources of energy and for
developed countries to maintain their economies they also must have affordable
reliable energy sources. Seventh, it is likely that demand for energy overtime will
increase and not decrease. Populations are increasing and there are still around a
billion people without electricity. New voracious energy demands from the computer
and cell phone industry are now robust and still growing. Eighth, energy supply and
demand are intimately influenced by price. Finally, law (international and domestic)
as well as markets can be expected to address the impact of energy production and
use on climate change.
III. THE ROLE OF THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME IN
FUTURE ENERGY PRICES.
Both domestic climate change-related law and emerging international law affect
energy prices. Domestically, of course, states have clean energy and greenhouse gas
initiatives that affect energy prices like renewable energy portfolios and feed in
tariffs to encourage renewable energy projects. Regional arrangements like the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) have carbon trading schemes or
programs of one sort or the other that are beginning to influence energy prices.
What is less appreciated and often somewhat overlooked is the growing impact
of emerging international climate change legal principles that are relevant to energy
prices. This article suggests that despite the relative lack of success of the
international community to forge an international regime to deal with climate change
over the past decades, certain enduring principles have nonetheless solidified out of
that process that may shape the future pricing of energy products.
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A. Climate Change, Energy Prices and international Regulation.
It has long been “officially” appreciated domestically and internationally that
even putative international regulation of greenhouse gases is relevant to energy
product pricing. For example, over two decades ago, the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission tackled the problem of putting a dollar amount in electric rates in
anticipation of international climate change regulation:
“Because of widespread concern about the risks of global warming at
state, national and international levels, future regulations are likely to
require the utility industry to limit its release
of these gases. If so,
utilities would incur real economic cost in order to comply with these
regulations.”
***
“A national and international consensus to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions is emerging. When the likelihood of future regulation is high, it
is reasonable to estimate the cost of compliance to utilities. Ignoring this
financial risk would be imprudent.”
***
“Monetizing the risk of greenhouse gas regulation is a prudent means of
reducing utility business risk by hedging against the future. . .[and]
considering the likelihood of . . . international greenhouse gas
regulations.”2
In 2013, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report on energy pricing reforms
tied together future energy pricing and greenhouse gases:
“Even future generations are affected [by underpriced energy] through
reduced availability of key inputs for growth and the damaging effects of
increased energy consumption on greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming.”
***
“Removing [economic energy] subsidies could lead to a 13 percent
decline in CO2 [carbon dioxide] emissions.” 3
B. The Emerging International Climate Change Regime.
Despite the sort of longstanding domestic and international acceptance of the
connections among climate change, energy prices and international regulation, an
international climate change regime has been very slow to emerge, leading to
observations that there is little international climate change “law” to apply.

2
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The following selected timeline from 1979 through 2012 illustrates the
challenging, rather tortured, path toward an emerging climate change regime over
the past three decades.4
In 1979, The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) sponsored the first
scientific World Climate Conference (WCC) which ultimately led to the
establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
In 1988, the IPCC was established by the WMO and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP).5 The IPCC seeks “to provide the world with a
clear scientific view of the current state of knowledge in climate change and its
potential environmental and socio-economic impacts”.6 Its first assessment report
came out in 1990 and its fifth assessment is due in 2013/2014.7 In general terms, the
IPCC assessment reports establish the importance of climate change and that it
merits political action to address.
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) was adopted and it entered into force in 1994.8 The UNFCCC in Article
2 set forth the twofold agenda for all subsequent conferences of the parties (COP)
that has guided the efforts in following years. That is, the “ultimate” objective is first
to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level to prevent dangerous
man-made interference with the climate system and, second, to do so in a timeframe
to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change in a sustainable way.
The UNFCCC is legally significant for what it does not do. It does not establish a
timeframe for achieving those Article 2 agenda goals. It does not impose any
obligation to curtail energy production and use that contributes GHG to the
atmosphere. It contains no enforcement mechanisms or specific targets to be
achieved. It is largely an aspirational legal instrument.
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted and it entered into
force in 2005. (The United States withdrew from the Protocol in 2001.) The Protocol
set internationally binding GHG emissions targets to reduce emissions below 1990
levels by the period 2008-2012. Kyoto placed a heavier burden on developed
countries to curtail GHG emissions than on developing countries. These targets have
not been met.
In 2007, the COP met in Bali, Indonesia. The COP adopted the Bali Roadmap
which included a Bali Action Plan meant to set a path and process for reaching a
shared vision and to deal with climate mitigation, with adaptation, with technology
4
For a complete timeline see Background on the UNFCC: The International Response to
Climate Change, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
5

History, IPCC, http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml (last visited Oct.
19, 2013).
6
Organization, IPCC, http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml (last visited Oct. 19,
2013).
7

History, IPPC http://ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.shtml. (last visited Oct.
19, 2013). The IPCC does not itself undertake either climate change research or monitoring of
climate information and data.
8
Full Text of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential _background/convention/background/items/1349.php (last
visited Oct. 19, 2013).

2013]

EMERGING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE

5

and with financing. The UNFCCC website accurately terms the Bali effort “highly
ambitious”, “overly optimistic” and one that “underestimated the complexity both of
climate change as a problem and of crafting a global response to it.” 9
In 2011, the COP met in Durban, South Africa. The Durban Conference stated
the need for a “fresh” “blueprint” to address climate change beyond 2020.10 The
COP committed to a plan to “come closer over time” to meet the “ultimate
objective” of Article 2 of the UNFCC to stabilize GHG concentrations. 11 The stated
goal was to achieve reduction in GHG emissions “to keep average global
temperatures rising no more than two degrees above their pre-industrial level…”12
The need to “build and preserve trust” among countries was noted as well the need
for “bolder and bigger actions”.
Most recently, the COP met in Doha, Qatar. The most significant action taken by
the COP was to adopt a proposed amendment to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to
establish a new commitment period for countries to curtail GHG emissions since the
old commitment period expired in 2012.13 The new period would be from 2013 to
2021. The COP also committed to reach a new agreement by 2015. Of less
significance was the declaration to open a “gateway” to “greater ambition and
action” on GHG emissions to “strengthen resolve”, “to streamline negotiations”, to
increase “ambition” to cut GHG and “to help vulnerable countries to adapt” to
climate change, and to make “progress toward” helping developing countries with
financial and technological support in their efforts to make clean energy investments
and have sustainable growth.
There are several factors that help to explain the lack of progress of the
international climate change regime toward firm and specific legal obligations to
internalize the externalities of GHG emissions in human activity including in prices
for the production and use of energy that produces GHG emissions.
First, climate change involves aspects of a commons (i.e. the upper atmosphere
used by all to dispose of GHG) with no legal right to exclude any one nation from so
using the atmosphere. This commons characteristic impedes reaching an agreement.
For example, it took nations almost thirty years from 1967 to 1994 to agree to a new
ocean regime for the deep seabed –a commons deemed the “common heritage of
mankind”.14

9
Now, up to and Beyond 2012: The Bali Road Map, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/key_steps/bali_road_map/items/6072.php
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
10

Durban: Towards full implementation of the UN Climate Change Convention, UNITED
NATIONS
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/key_steps/durban_outcomes/items/6825.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Doha Amendment, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocaol/ doha_amendment/items/7362.php.
14
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CLIMATE CHANGE,

Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), U.N. GAOR,
1933rd plen. Mtg, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (December 17, 1970), reprinted in [1971] 10 I.L.M. 220
(1971).
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Second, there is great difficulty in reaching agreement on legal obligations
between developed countries and developing countries. Broadly stated, the
developing countries argue that it is the developed, industrial, countries that caused
the climate change problem and it is their responsibility (not the developing nations)
to remedy it.15 The developed countries, for their part, argue that developing nations
must take the world as they find it – a world with a need to curtail GHG and the
developing countries must be part of the solution.
Third, there is tension between efforts to mitigate GHG emissions and efforts to
adapt to climate change. 16 Mitigation advocates argue that international climate
change efforts should focus on stopping GHG emissions and adopting steps to curtail
and limit GHG emissions. Adaptation advocates, to a significant degree, accept that
climate change is occurring and that efforts should be taken to adapt to the change
like building sea walls, changing agricultural crop selection, shifting food choices,
conservation of fresh water resources, devising new building construction methods,
etc. Those pushing for curtailment to mitigate climate change often view adaptation
policies as a form of surrender in the battle to combat climate change that just diverts
needed mitigation resources.
Fourth, there continues to be a lack of agreement on the optimum mechanism to
use to address curtailment of GHG. Some urge that a voluntary GHG reduction
scheme be adopted. Others push for a command and control scheme administered
through a formal international organization or regime. Others urge that a marketbased mechanism be utilized (some form of cap and trade mechanism similar to that
used in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 which created a private market in
emissions rights from stationary sources of air pollution (sulfur and other
pollutants)).17 Still others urge the simple adoption of a carbon tax on GHG
emissions from all sectors.18
Finally, there is, of course, considerable political pressure from various, public
and private, domestic and international, constituencies all attempting to influence the
process and content of an ultimate international climate change regime or
mechanism.

15

For the developing countries position, see Christine Batruch, “Hot Air” as Precedent
for Developing Countries: Equity Considerations, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL L. AND POL’Y 45 (19981999).
16

MICHAEL B. GERRARD & KATRINA FISCHER KUH, THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 3-4 (2012).
17

See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401 et seq.; See THE ENERGY LAW GROUP, ENERGY LAW AND
POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, Environmental Protection and Energy Development, 5-13
(2000).
18

See N. Gregory Mankiew, A Carbon Fee That America Could Live With, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2013.
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C. Some Enduring Principles from the Emerging Climate Change Regime
Influencing Energy Prices.19
Without meaningful legal agreement reached in some three decades of effort, it is
tempting to dismiss the international climate change process as largely irrelevant to
energy prices of GHG emitting energy products. Despite that lack of progress, there
are certain overlapping, enduring, legal principles that have now become embedded
in the process that should not be ignored in deciding whether, how and to what
degree to reflect the present externality of GHG emissions in energy prices. Taken
together, these principles, which have soft law20 and hard law aspects, will legally
influence, to a greater or lesser degree, both international and domestic costing of
GHG emissions and the embedding of those costs in future energy prices of GHG
emitting products from electricity to gasoline to natural gas.
1. Limited State Sovereignty over natural resources.
This principle of limited state sovereignty over natural resources is relevant to
addressing GHG emissions generated in energy fuel cycles especially by fossil fuel
use. It is a longstanding fundament of international law that states have “permanent
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources” including over fossil energy
resources like coal, oil and natural gas that emit GHG. 21 This is a strong notion in
international law especially for developing nations. However, it is also a fundament
of international law that that sovereignty is not absolute in a variety of ways. The
related principle of sovereign equality necessarily means that one state may not
exercise its sovereignty (including sovereignty over energy natural wealth and
resources) in a way that encroaches on the sovereignty of another state. This notion
of state responsibility in using natural resources over which a state has sovereignty
is embodied in the general and well-recognized principle of international law, sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (one must so use own as not to do injury to
another).22 In an environmental air pollution context, the famous Trail Smelter
Arbitration held that a State is responsible for injury to the neighboring territory by
noxious fumes emanating from within its territory. 23 And Principle 21 of the 1972
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment further extended the limitation
on state sovereignty in the exploitation of natural resources “to ensure”

19
For a summation of the larger foundational predicates of the emerging international
climate change regime including the principles referred to in this section, see ROWENA
MAGUIRE, Foundations of International Climate Law: Objectives, Principles and Methods in
Climate Change and the Law 83-110 (Hollo, Kalooves and Mehling, Eds., 2013); See
generally, PHILLIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 231-290
(2d Ed. 2003).
20

See ENERGY LAW GROUP, supra note 17, at 4-18-4-19.

21

United Nations Generally Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/5344/Add.1 and
Add/1/Corr.1. A/L.412/Rev.2 (Dec. 14, 1962), reprinted in [1963] 2 I.L.M 223(1963).
22
23

The Corfu Channel Case, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).

Trail Smelter Arbitration (US v. CA), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 (1949), 35 Am J.
Int’l L. 684 (1941).
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environmental damage is not caused to “areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction” and not just in neighboring state territory. 24
This principle of limitation on state sovereignty in the use of natural resources
has been embedded in the emerging climate change regime from the outset. The
1992 UNFCCC, which is aimed at stabilization of GHG emissions by States into the
atmosphere, “recalls” in its preamble that:
States have, in accordance with . . . principles of international law, the
sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies, and the
responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction.25
The limitation on state sovereignty with regard to use of energy natural resources
extends to more specific action to prevent GHG emissions action as well and not just
to account for acts already done that cause harm. Of course, this is a general
principle in all environmental law the object of which is to prevent pollution from
occurring. Article 2 of the UNFCCC states that its objective and the objective of all
subsequent instruments is “to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system.”26
Arguably, this principle of limited state sovereignty over natural resources
including a responsibility to prevent harm applies also to a state allowing or
approving the pricing of energy products and goods in a way that unduly contributes
to GHG that cause climate change and harm to other states, to commons areas, and
to the global environment.
2. The Polluter Pays Principle.
The polluter pays principle says that actors responsible for pollution (individuals,
corporations, states etc.) should pay the costs associated with their polluting
activities. Thus, if the limitations on state sovereignty are ignored and preventive
action is not taken and pollution results in the form of GHG, then the polluter pays
principle becomes relevant. That greenhouse gases like C02 are pollutants is not
controversial. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA held
that the Clean Air Act authorizes federal regulation of emissions of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouses because they are pollutants under the statute. 27
At the international climate change level, the principle is controversial and less
accepted than other principles. At the same time, it is the principle that would have
the most direct implications for energy prices and pricing. That is, under the
principle, the costs of pollution in the form of GHG should be reflected in the prices
24

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
48/14/Rev.1 (1973); 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972). available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/humanenvironment.html.
25
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio De Janeiro, Braz.,
June 3-14, 1992, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, preamble, (May
9, 1992). http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/ items/1349.php.
26

Id.at art. 2.

27

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
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charged for energy products all along energy fuel cycles from production to
consumption. However, at the international level the principle becomes somewhat
problematic as it would have an impact both on state subsidies of various forms and
on the issues surrounding the divide between developing and developed nations
addressed in the principle below dealing with common but differentiated
responsibilities. As a result the polluter pays is at best a soft law principle. For
example, The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio
Declaration) (a nonbinding soft law instrument) provides only that States “should
endeavor”:
To promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments ,
taking into account the approach that the
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of
pollution,
with
due
regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and
investment. 28
This is the only formal appearance the principle makes in the international
climate change regime process. It is not incorporated into the UNFCCC. However,
the 2013 IMF Report referred to above in calling for removing economic energy
subsidies and criticizing reduced availability of GHG emissions in underpriced
energy could be viewed as an endorsement of the polluter pays principle. 29
The polluter pays principle in domestic law is better known and less
controversial as a principle. Its articulation in the international climate change
regime (at least in the Rio Declaration) supports its application in domestic energy
pricing situations to include GHG emissions associated with energy transactions in
energy prices.
3. The Precautionary Principle.30
The precautionary principle is now a staple principle in international
environmental law instruments generally and in the emerging international climate
change regime in particular, although its precise meaning and scope of application is
still evolving and variable. Generally, it is a significant extension of the polluter pays
principle and the limitation on state sovereignty to not use natural resources in a way
to do harm to neighboring states or commons. The precautionary principle generally
raises an obligation in anticipation of conduct or activities that would result in harm.
It also lessens the need for causation to be firmly established so that it may apply in
cases of scientific uncertainty. It also may operate to shift the burden of proof – from
the one claiming harm to establish environmental harm to potential polluters to
establish that their action will not harm the environment. The principle’s efficacy
increases with level of risk of harm.
28
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio De Janeiro, Braz.,
June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 16,
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/
Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163.
29
30

Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 3.

See generally James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining Precautionary Principle
in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 423 (1995); SANDS, supra note 19, at
266-79.
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In the emerging climate change regime context, the principle is embedded as a
soft law principle.
Article 3 (3) of the UNFCCC provides that States “should”:
Take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimize the
causes of climate change
and mitigate its adverse effects. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures,
taking
into account that policies and measures to deal with climate
change should be cost-effective so
as to ensure global benefits at the
lowest possible cost.31
This would seem to encourage appropriate governmental regulatory bodies like
public service commissions and other governmental bodies to reflect the cost of
anticipated GHG emissions in some manner into prices under their jurisdiction.
4. The Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle.
This principle accepts in a climate change context, the self-evident reality that
while States generally are legal sovereign equals, they are in reality not all the same.
It also reflects the considerable divide in the emerging climate change regime
between developed and developing nations and expressed in overarching equity and
fairness terms.
Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration provides in relevant part:
In view of the different contributions to global environmental
degradation, sates have common
but differentiated responsibilities.
The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that
they
bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the
pressures their
societies place on the global environment and of the
technologies and financial resources they command.32
And, Article 3 (1) of the UNFCCC similarly provides:
The parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present
and future generations
of humankind on the basis of equity and in
accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities
and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties
should take the lead in combatting climate change and the adverse effects
thereof.
Thus, under this principle all states, developing and developed, have shared
obligations to protect the climate system. However, the extent of those obligations
differ in relation to their contribution to climate change and their ability to do
something about it. As a result, the 1995 Kyoto Protocol calling for obligations to
curtail GHG, excluded developing countries from binding obligations to reduce
GHGs.33
31

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, supra note 9, at art. 3.

32

United Nations Conference,, supra 28, at Principle 7.

33

See, AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
ANN. REP., ABA SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
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For energy prices, this may mean that energy prices in developed countries might
be under greater pressure to reflect the cost of GHG and under lesser or no pressure
to include those costs in developing countries.
5. The Duty to Cooperate Principle.
This principle of cooperation is firmly entrenched in international environmental
law but often overlooked and undervalued in examining obligations of individuals,
corporations and States. It imposes at a minimum a duty to negotiate in good faith
and may “translate into more specific commitments through techniques designed to
ensure information sharing and participation in decision making”. 34
In a climate change context, the Rio Declaration in Principle 7 provides that
“States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem” and Principle 27 provides
that “states and people shall cooperate in good faith”. 35 The UNFCCC Preamble
“calls for the widest possible cooperation” and Article 3 (3) states that “The Parties
should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system. 36
This principle of cooperation would seem to support a disclosure of pricing
information, components and methodology for energy fuel cycles that produce GHG
by corporations and governmental regulatory bodies.
IV. CONCLUSION.
This article accepts that science indicates that climate change is occurring by the
accumulation of GHG in the atmosphere and that the use of fossil fuel sources of
energy (primarily coal, oil, and natural gas) by humans contributes very significant
amounts of GHG to the atmosphere. It also accepts that climate change, in turn,
produces potentially adverse effects on global and local societies. It also accepts that
there is a connection between GHG emissions and the price at which those fossil fuel
energy products are bought and sold.
The largely unsuccessful effort over the past three decades or so to forge an
international regime to address climate and GHG emissions with meaningful legal
obligations that are enforceable does not mean that effort is irrelevant to pricing of
energy products that contribute GHG to the atmosphere. Several enduring hard law
and soft law principles have become imbedded as a result of the climate change
regime process that are, and will be, germane to energy pricing decisions. Those
principles include the principle of limited state sovereignty over the use of natural
resource (including fossil fuel resources) to prevent extra territorial damage, the
polluter pays principle, the precautionary principle, the common but differentiated
responsibility principle, and the duty to cooperate.
Domestic price regulators, advocates, energy corporations, legislatures, courts,
and policy makers all should be aware of these principles in determining, setting,
challenging and reviewing energy prices in the decades ahead.

(1997), reprinted in FRED BOSSELMAN, ET AL., ENERGY
736-38 (Robert C. Clark et. Al. eds., 3d ed. 2010).

ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

34

SANDS, supra note 19 at 250.

35

United Nations Conference, supra note 28, at Principles 7, 27.

36

United Nations Conference, supra note 9, at preamble, art. 3.

